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Black Workers in the Export Years: Latin America, 
1880-1930 
George Reid Andrews 
University of Pittsburgh 
Some fifteen years ago in these pages, Emilia Viotti da Costa noted a 
characteristic of Brazilian labor historiography that she could have applied 
to Latin America as a whole. "Historians rarely mention blacks or mulat 
toes. . . . Clearly there is here a problem that deserves more attention. 
What role did blacks play in the working class? How did they relate to 
immigrants and vice-versa? . . . These are some questions waiting for an 
swers."1 
Da Costa was not alone in wondering about these questions; and in the 
years since she posed them, a good deal of research and writing has ap 
peared on the historical experiences of Afro-Latin Americans in the work 
force. This essay attempts to synthesize that literature into some general 
observations concerning the role of black workers in the initial period of 
working-class formation in Latin America from 1880 to 1930.2 
These were the years of the "export boom." Intensifying industrializa 
tion and urbanization in Europe and North America greatly stimulated 
demand for Latin American primary commodities, producing a wave of 
export-led economic growth that had profound social and political conse 
quences for the region.3 Inevitably, some of those consequences were racial 
in nature. Latin American societies had a long history of being organized 
and stratified along racial lines, and throughout the Atlantic world the 
export years saw the development of racial theories and institutions the 
consequences of which we are still wrestling with at century's close: scien 
tific racism in Europe and North America, Jim Crow segregation in the 
United States, the beginnings of apartheid in South Africa.4 
What were the impacts of the export years on racial dynamics and 
"racial orders" in Latin America, particularly at the level of the working 
class? In proposing some answers to that question, this essay focuses on 
three principal areas of conflict and negotiation among the region's multi 
racial work forces: access to land, racialized labor migration, and unioniza 
tion. 
Land 
From the colonial period onward, control over rural labor in Latin America 
has been inextricably tied to control over land. Rural workers who hold 
sufficient land to feed themselves and their families are workers who can 
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refuse plantation employment or accept it only on terms that are advan 
tageous to them. In colonies such as Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela, African 
slavery became so widespread precisely because low population densities 
and easy access to land on the frontiers produced chronic shortages of free 
workers. Not surprisingly, then, the abolition of slavery during the 1800s 
and the freeing of black workers ignited intense struggles over control of 
and access to land in the plantation zones. 
In mainland Spanish America, slavery gradually disintegrated during 
the independence wars of the 1810s and 1820s and the subsequent civil 
wars that afflicted much of the region through the 1850s and 1860s. Numer 
ous plantations and haciendas were destroyed or badly damaged in these 
conflicts, and thousands of slaves won their freedom through military ser 
vice or by fleeing the estates. "Plantation discipline collapsed" in Ven 
ezuela, reports John Lombardi, as slaves fled to join cumbes (communities 
of runaway slaves) or guerrilla bands.5 In the coastal sugar-growing zones 
of Peru, many owners abandoned their haciendas in the face of widespread 
civil violence and banditry. Slaves took advantage of owners' absence to 
create "liberated territories" on the estates, sheltering runaway slaves and 
guerrillas and in some cases even administering haciendas in a state of 
"virtual self-government."6 Similar conditions obtained in the sugar 
growing Cauca Valley of Colombia, where recurrent civil wars between 
Liberals and Conservatives made it impossible for landowners to rees 
tablish control over the work force. Many slaves and free blacks withdrew 
from the plantation sector entirely, establishing armed settlements in the 
neighboring hills and forests; those who remained behind used their scar 
city, and then their newfound freedom (final abolition was enacted in the 
early 1850s in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela), to 
impose new working conditions on the plantations, as a local official re 
ported at the time. The ex-slave libertos 
have realized their position and rights as free men, leaving estates where they do 
not wish to remain because of the excessive demands of the landowner and 
moving to others that offer better terms, so that. . . today one may say that [the 
libertos] set the price for land rentals. . . . Even when it is certain that there exist 
marked tendencies for some landowners to aggressively confront the libertos, 
imposing high rents . . . they have been forced to accept the counter-proposals 
made by their former slaves.7 
This bargaining continued through the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, leading 
many landlords to withdraw from tasks of direct management themselves 
and, as in Peru, to rent out their estates to intermediaries. "Most hacen 
dados are bankrupt," reported a visitor to the valley in 1880. "They lack the 
capital to rebuild what has been destroyed and most of them, after fighting 
for many years against the destructive fanaticism of the blacks, have given 
up and don't want to begin all over again."8 
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At the very moment that those words were being written, however, the 
relationship between landowners and laborers throughout the region was 
starting to shift. During the first fifty years of independence (1820-1870), 
war, economic dislocation, and abolition had combined to place land 
owners in much of Spanish America in a position of marked disadvantage 
in bargaining with their black laborers. With the coming of the export 
boom, this bargaining relationship began to reverse. Increased demand for 
exports gave landowners more incentive to regain control over their hold 
ings, to increase them where possible, and to expand production. Inevitably 
these efforts encountered resistance from peasant cultivators; but national 
governments financed by revenues from import and export duties were 
now in a position to field armed forces that could meet that resistance far 
more effectively than earlier in the century. By the late 1800s Peru's ban 
doleros and guerrillas, many of whom in the coastal areas were Afro 
Peruvian, no longer roamed with impunity through the countryside.9 Co 
lombia's Liberal guerrillas (in the Cauca Valley drawn heavily from the 
black peasantry) fought their last actions during the War of the Thousand 
Days and finally acknowledged Conservative victory in 1903.10 Even in the 
Dominican Republic, one of the least developed nations in the region, a 
growing US-financed sugar industry, and later direct intervention by the 
United States itself (1916-1924), provided the means for a potent offensive 
against rural gavilleros, who were then finally subdued by Rafael Trujillo's 
National Guard during the 1920s and 1930s.11 
This extension of state authority into the countryside enabled land 
owners to reestablish control over lands that, earlier in the century, they 
had been forced to cede to squatters and tenants. It also permitted national 
governments to reassert control over publicly owned state lands, vast tracts 
of which were now handed over to private investors through land grants or 
sales. In Mexico the distribution of state-owned lands during this period 
struck directly at Indian and mestizo peasants and played a central role in 
creating the preconditions for the Mexican Revolution; in Colombia and 
the Dominican Republic the privatization of public or communally owned 
lands (terrenos comuneros) had similarly negative effects on Afro-Latin 
American peasants, who found themselves pushed off their subsistence 
farms and losing the investments that they had made in buildings, coffee 
bushes, fruit trees, and other crops.12 
As suggested above, struggles over land were simultaneously struggles 
over labor. Workers denied access to the squatting rights or public lands 
that they had claimed earlier in the 1800s were now far more dependent on 
plantation employment, and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of pro 
letarianization. Those pressures varied, however, in response to the inten 
sity of export-based growth in given regions. Where such growth was weak 
or limited, black peasants were more able to retain access to land and thus 
escape proletarianization. One such case was the Pacific coastal rain forests 
of Colombia and Ecuador. During the colonial period these had been 
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centers of placer gold mining carried out by African slaves. Following 
emancipation the ex-slaves remained in the rain forest, organizing them 
selves into extended kinship networks that held communal mining, hunt 
ing, and cultivating rights to specific parcels of land.13 During the late 1800s 
British, American, and Colombian investors obtained government conces 
sions to mine the major rivers of the Colombian part of the region and 
brought in mechanized dredges to do so. This set off a flurry of lawsuits by 
Afro-Colombians attempting, in some cases successfully, to document their 
rights to the land. In cases in which they were unable to establish those 
rights, black families responded by moving deeper into the rain forest, 
where neither the companies' dredges nor hacienda agriculture could 
follow. 
This continued access to frontier land enabled Afro-Colombians to 
remain in the subsistence economy and accept employment on the dredges 
only when the terms and conditions suited them. "Every black has his 
placer or little mine, where he works several days of the week . . . with his 
family," observed a Colombian visitor to the coast in 1895. "He prefers to 
earn little but to be free and work on his own accountf;] rarely does he 
endure a permanent job."14 Unable to contract a stable labor force? 
neither Europeans nor highlander Colombians could withstand the rigors 
of the rain forest?most of the mining companies had abandoned the 
region by 1900, leaving production in the hands of local miners.15 "There 
reigns a total absence of an industrial mining tradition" along the coast, 
complained a Colombian government report in 1943; and as late as the 
1970s, female miners outnumbered males in the region, reflecting the con 
tinuing family basis of mining.16 
Harsh environmental conditions and the almost complete absence of 
plantation agriculture in the region permitted black workers in the rain 
forest to retain uninterrupted access to, and indeed control over, the means 
of subsistence. It thus represented one end of the spectrum of black work 
ers' experience during the export years: virtually complete freedom from 
proletarianization. Lying at an intermediate point on the spectrum were 
those regions of secondary importance in export production, which were 
affected by the boom but not wholly transformed by it. The growth of sugar 
exports, for example, was most strongly felt in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 
Dominican Republic; growth was much weaker in Brazil, once the center 
of world sugar cultivation but now surpassed by more highly capitalized 
producers of cane sugar in the Caribbean and beet sugar in Europe. Lack 
ing the wherewithal either to expand cultivation or invest in more mecha 
nized forms of production, and facing the loss of their slave labor forces 
after abolition in 1888, Brazilian sugar planters encouraged ex-slaves to 
remain on the estates as sharecroppers or labor-tenants, growing their own 
crops for subsistence or sale. This represented a considerable step up from 
slavery, and sometimes even more than that. In the sugar zones around Rio 
de Janeiro, for example, Afro-Brazilian tenants producing corn, beans, and 
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manioc for sale in the capital enjoyed "a high degree of autonomy in 
relation to the administrators of the plantation," concludes one historian.17 
Conditions were more difficult in the sugar zones of the northeast, where 
urban markets were smaller and poorer and the region was buffeted by 
multiyear droughts. Even (or especially) under these conditions, however, 
tenantry represented a means to escape complete dispossession, which did 
not occur in the northeast until after 1950, when a revived, recapitalized 
sugar industry gradually eliminated tenantry in favor of wage labor.18 
Workers in the secondary sugar zones?that is, those bypassed by the 
export boom?thus retained access to land through the first half of the 
twentieth century.19 The story was different in the core zones of export 
production, where black workers suffered almost complete dispossession. 
The principal example of this phenomenon is Cuba, the epicenter of the 
sugar export boom. The boom had actually begun precociously in the 
island, in the 1820s and 1830s, and had been based initially on African 
slavery. Unlike mainland Spanish America, which struggled for indepen 
dence during the first half of the 1800s, Cuban elites remained loyal to 
Spain. This enabled the island to escape the violence and destruction that 
undermined slavery on the mainland. Instead slavery, the slave trade, and 
plantation agriculture all continued intact in Cuba, and indeed at levels 
higher than ever before, into the second half of the nineteenth century. 
When the island finally experienced the violence of the independence wars 
(1868-1880,1895-1898), it suffered much the same effects as the mainland 
half a century earlier: the destruction of much of the sugar industry, flight 
and insubordination on the plantations, and the eventual abolition (in 
1886) of slavery.20 
Unlike the mainland, however, Cuba's economic recovery from the 
wars was almost immediate. Capital swept in from the United States to buy 
ruined plantations and create a new, expanded, and modernized sugar 
industry. The resulting recovery and expansion of the sugar estates hit hard 
at all the island's peasant cultivators, and especially at Afro-Cubans. Part of 
the reorganization of the sugar industry was the subcontracting of cane 
production to small- and medium-holder colonos, who grew cane either on 
their own land or on land rented from the plantations. Some black farmers, 
particularly those who owned land, were able to take part in colono pro 
duction; but as early as 1900 the ranks of the colonato were over 
whelmingly white, and they became even more so as time went on.21 With 
drawing in the face of the plantations' advance, many Afro-Cubans, 
especially ex-slaves with no claims to land ownership, migrated from the 
central and western parts of the island to the eastern province of Oriente, 
where large expanses of land remained unsettled and available for cultiva 
tion by squatters. But empty land attracted not just peasants but sugar 
companies as well. During the early 1900s a number of US-owned firms 
opened operations in the province, again driving smallholders off the land. 
The result was increasing tension and petty banditry in the countryside and 
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then a full-fledged jacquerie, the Race War of 1912, in which 5,000-6,000 
Afro-Cuban peasants and independence war veterans were massacred by 
government forces.22 
For black workers in Cuba, the export boom meant almost total dis 
possession from the land and full proletarianization. The same was true in 
the coffee zones of southeastern Brazil, another center of export produc 
tion. Here the final abolition of slavery in 1888 posed the usual challenge to 
landowners?how to keep newly freed libertos at work on the plantations. 
In the older parts of the coffee zones, cash-starved planters trying to coax 
yields from aging trees and badly eroded land were forced to cede share 
cropping and tenantry rights comparable to those granted to Brazilian 
sugar workers. Under these conditions, however, coffee cultivation was 
barely profitable, and during the early 1900s more and more plantation 
owners turned their land over to cattle grazing, in effect withdrawing from 
the export sector and dispensing with most of their workers.23 
In the newer frontier zones of western S?o Paulo, where recently 
cleared virgin lands were far more productive, planters hired families of 
colonos on multiyear contracts to care for several hundred coffee trees in 
return for a cash payment, housing, and the right to plant wheat, corn, and 
other crops in the rows between the trees. Growing their own crops for 
subsistence and sale enabled colono families to escape complete proletaria 
nization. By the 1920s and 30s a significant proportion of them had suc 
ceeded in acquiring small- and medium-sized holdings of their own bought 
with savings earned from family labor. The coffee boom thus generated a 
substantial rural middle class in S?o Paulo, but very few of those new 
smallholders were black. As in Cuba, the coffee planters had opted to keep 
the colonato white and to deny such employment to their former slaves.24 
That decision had devastating consequences for long-term black upward 
mobility, or rather the lack thereof; it also reflected, and was made possible 
by, a second important consequence of the export boom: racialized labor 
migration. 
White Immigration 
The explosive growth in trans-Atlantic commerce during the 1880-1930 
period was paralleled by equally explosive growth in trans-Atlantic migra 
tion. Almost twenty-eight million Europeans migrated to the United States 
during those years, and ten to eleven million to Latin America.25 Most 
came to Argentina, Uruguay, and southern Brazil, where meat- and 
cereals-based economies offered working conditions and opportunities 
comparable to those of the Midwest of the United States and Canada. 
Fewer were willing to travel to the plantation zones, where they would face 
harsh disease environments, degrading working conditions, and job compe 
tition from large ex-slave populations. (Similar objections applied to the 
US South, which received correspondingly little European migration.) 
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Latin American elites and policymakers invested considerable effort 
in trying to overcome these obstacles and persuade Europeans to come. 
They had two main motives for doing so: first, to undercut the bargaining 
position of native-born "national" laborers by flooding the labor market 
with foreigners; and second, in keeping with the scientific racist dictates of 
the era, to "improve" the national population through "whitening."26 Na 
tional and state governments throughout the region created programs to 
promote, and in some cases actually to subsidize, European immigration, 
but only in Brazil and Cuba did these programs come close to achieving 
their objectives. In both countries, success was closely tied to export perfor 
mance. A number of Brazilian states created such programs, but it was S?o 
Paulo's, funded by abundant coffee earnings, that ended up attracting over 
half of the Europeans who came to the country: 2.0 million immigrants 
between 1890 and 1930 (out of a national total of 3.5 million), a figure 
larger than the entire state population (1.4 million) at the beginning of that 
period. Cuba did almost as well, attracting 780,000 Spaniards between 1900 
and 1930, a figure equal to almost half the national population in 19?0.27 
Immigration at these levels more than fulfilled elites' goals of flooding 
local labor markets. As Europeans poured in, they displaced black workers 
in almost direct proportion to the volume of migration: The larger the 
number of Europeans, the more devastating the impacts on local black 
populations. Thus in Buenos Aires, which by 1914 had 780,000 immigrants 
and fewer than 10,000 Afro-Argentines, blacks and mulattoes were vir 
tually eliminated from the skilled trades, factory employment, and even 
street vending, in which they had been quite visible through the 1870s. By 
1900, workers of color were confined almost entirely to domestic service, 
occasional day labor, and low-level service positions in government of 
fices.28 
The displacement of black workers in the Brazilian state of S?o Paulo, 
where by 1920 the immigrant population was 830,000 and Afro-Brazilians 
some 650,000, was almost as extreme as in Buenos Aires. Immigrants 
pushed blacks and mulattoes aside not just in the rural sector, as we have 
seen, but in urban employment as well. In the state capital, by the early 
1900s the labor force in construction and industry was eighty to ninety 
percent foreign-born. Some Afro-Brazilians found regular jobs in factories 
or as laborers building the city's tramways and power grids, but most were 
relegated to domestic service and informal day labor.29 
More of an equilibrium was struck in cities like Lima and Rio de 
Janeiro, where blacks continued to outnumber Europeans. In Lima, immi 
grants displaced Afro-Peruvians from factory work but were insufficient in 
number to push them out of construction, transport, or the artisan trades.30 
Afro-Brazilians in Rio de Janeiro also succeeded in retaining a place in the 
wage-labor market, by holding their own in urban transport, as dock 
workers, and in factory employment. Europeans were clearly preferred for 
employment in commerce and the skilled trades, however, and within the 
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industrial sector there were clear disparities between the two groups. Afro 
Brazilians were most likely to be found in the textile industry, the most 
poorly paid industrial employment, and European workers in the textile 
factories were far more likely to be paid an hourly wage and thus to have 
higher earnings than Afro-Brazilians, who were generally paid piecework 
rates.31 
Much the same was true in Cuba, where Afro-Cubans retained em 
ployment opportunities in construction and industry but complained of 
being relegated to the least-skilled, most poorly paid positions. A principal 
area of conflict was the tobacco industry, in which Cubans formed the 
majority of workers but Spaniards were favored for more highly paid posi 
tions as cigar rollers. So marked was the preference for Spaniards that 
many Cuban rollers left the island to seek work in the United States, 
fueling the growth of the cigar industry in Tampa and Key West. Spaniards 
were also favored for employment in cigarette factories, where wages ran 
some thirty percent higher than in the cigar factories.32 They completely 
dominated employment in commerce, as well as technical positions in in 
dustry, including the all-important sugar industry. At the level of field 
workers, seasonal migrants came from Spain every fall to work in the sugar 
harvest, returning home in the spring with their earnings. Their presence 
formed a formidable obstacle to black canecutters' efforts to bargain for 
higher wages. Not for nothing did the Afro-Cuban newspaper column "Ide 
ales de una raza" complain in 1929 of blacks being caught between "two 
great evils: foreigners in the cities and foreigners in the countryside."33 
Why were European workers so consistently able to push Afro-Latin 
Americans aside in the competition for jobs? Part of the answer lies in the 
racialized images that employers throughout the region held of European 
and Afro-Latin-American workers: the former as industrious, reliable, re 
sponsible; the latter as lazy, recalcitrant, and irresponsible. Both images 
corresponded to the racist ideologies of the period. The image of black 
workers was further grounded in and confirmed by employers' and land 
owners' experience with black workers, first under slavery and then during 
the postemancipation years. Resistance to work discipline had been a con 
stant feature of plantation slavery, and that resistance had intensified under 
conditions of freedom. Ex-slaves and their descendants were determined to 
avoid any form of labor discipline that threatened to restore them to the 
condition of slaves. From the point of view of employers, this made them 
deeply problematic as potential employees.34 
Once arrived in the region, European workers proved no fonder of 
local forms of labor discipline than their black counterparts. In Argentina, 
Brazil, Cuba, and elsewhere they took a prominent role in labor mobiliza 
tion and work stoppages, and as many as half of the Europeans who came 
to Latin America either returned home or moved on to the United States 
rather than submit to local working conditions.35 Nevertheless, they re 
mained much-sought by local employers and continued to receive prefer 
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ence for employment throughout the export period. Given the racial doc 
trines of the day, it was hardly surprising that the preferences expressed in 
state policy were replicated in individual hiring decisions?especially when 
many of those decisions were being made by immigrants themselves. While 
most Europeans worked as unskilled laborers, a number succeeded in es 
tablishing themselves as small tradesmen and shopkeepers, in the process 
posing a significant competitive challenge to members of the native-born 
middle class. In Buenos Aires in 1914, eighty percent of small proprietors? 
shopkeepers and owners of workshops and small factories?were immi 
grants. Europeans were similarly overrepresented among employers in 
Cuba and S?o Paulo. In the latter they formed a visible wing not just of the 
middle class but of the industrial bourgeoisie. Immigrant proprietors 
showed a strong tendency toward ethnic solidarity in their hiring practices, 
leading Cuban workers in 1902 to protest to Congress the "odious privi 
leges in hiring enjoyed by Spanish workers protected by bosses of their 
same nationality." Immigrant workers capitalized on that tendency by 
bringing in their relatives, friends, and neighbors to apply for jobs at the 
firms where they worked.36 
Formal and informal racial preferences and ties of ethnic solidarity 
among immigrant employers and workers thus played a powerful role in 
determining the outcomes of labor market competition in the export econ 
omies. The importance of racial and ethnic preferences during this period is 
further evidenced by the contrasting case of export-based economies 
which, having failed to obtain white European immigration (or, in the case 
of Cuba, sufficient white immigration), instead resorted to blacks: West 
Indian laborers from Jamaica, Haiti, and other Caribbean islands. 
Black Immigration 
Throughout Latin America, employers and elites openly preferred white 
workers over nonwhites. But only four countries?Argentina, Brazil, 
Cuba, and Uruguay?had the combination of job opportunities and work 
ing conditions required to obtain such workers. Those countries that did 
not, and that required large labor forces to undertake major infrastructural 
and construction projects, were forced to turn elsewhere. One source of 
such workers was East Asia; the other was the British and French West 
Indies, where the decline of the sugar industry and severe economic stagna 
tion had forced laborers to seek work abroad. 
West Indian immigration diffused through much of Spanish America 
during this period; the largest migratory streams went to Cuba (slightly over 
300,000 immigrants between 1900 and 1930), Venezuela (200-300,000), and 
Panama (150-200,000).37 All three countries were undertaking massive 
projects: in Cuba, the reconstruction and expansion of the sugar industry; in 
Venezuela, the creation of the oil industry; and in Panama, the building of 
the Panama Canal and of banana plantations along the Caribbean coast. 
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And in all three countries those projects were undertaken by corporations 
based in the United States: in Cuba, by US-owned sugar companies; in 
Venezuela, by Standard Oil and other firms; and in Panama, by the Panama 
Canal Company and the United Fruit Company. 
Latin American elites and governments, committed to the "whitening" 
of their national societies, actively discouraged black immigration and in 
some cases formally banned it.38 US-owned companies, by contrast, were 
completely uninterested in the racial "improvement" of the countries in 
which they operated. Rather, their principal concern was the provision of 
labor in adequate numbers, regardless of its race or provenance. This con 
trast between Latin American and US interests was most visible in Cuba, 
where the national government had subsidized Spanish immigration to 
provide workers for the sugar industry. Spaniards and Afro-Cubans alike 
found conditions on the plantations barely tolerable, however, and many 
responded by withdrawing from plantation labor and pursuing other op 
portunities in the cities. In search of new sources of supply, the sugar 
companies, and especially the newer US-owned firms in the eastern prov 
ince of Oriente, turned to Haiti and Jamaica. Cuban nationalists responded 
with cries of protest against the "Africanization" of the island; but the 
government was unable to withstand the demands of the sugar companies, 
and authorized the entry of black immigrants.39 
The labor shortage was even more acute in Panama, where by 1913 
and 1914 some 45,000 to 50,000 men were on the Canal Company payroll in 
a country of fewer than half a million people.40 The banana zones of the 
sparsely settled Caribbean coast presented similar problems to the United 
Fruit Company. The Costa Rican province of Lim?n, for example, had a 
total population of less than 8,000 in 1892; between 1900 and 1913 United 
Fruit imported over 20,000 West Indians into the province.41 
Canal Company and United Fruit administrators gave no formal pref 
erence to West Indian laborers over locally born Hispanics. Both groups 
were lumped together on the "silver roll," a system of vocational segrega 
tion that meant lower pay and inferior medical care and housing for non 
US workers.42 However, the West Indians' command of English, and their 
efforts to cultivate close ties of patronage with their American supervisors 
and employers, gave them visible advantages in both companies. As the 
Canal Company sought to reduce its payroll and labor costs during the 
Great Depression and after, West Indians seem to have been retained in 
larger numbers than Panamanians, and some were even promoted to re 
place more highly paid American technicians and supervisors.43 
This was even more the case at United Fruit, where outbreaks of 
Panama disease (a fungus that attacks banana plants) and then the Great 
Depression led the company to cut back and then close its Atlantic Coast 
plantations during the 1920s and 1930s. As the company reduced its pay 
roll, West Indians were promoted to replace Americans as clerks and su 
pervisors, and as the plantations closed down in the 1930s, West Indians 
This content downloaded from 130.49.185.203 on Mon, 14 Apr 2014 10:27:19 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Black Workers in the Export Years 17 
who had worked or grown bananas for the company took advantage of its 
withdrawal to buy parcels of land and establish small- and medium-sized 
family farms. The result was the creation by midcentury of a black rural 
middle class in the old banana zones, a complete reversal of the impact of 
the export boom elsewhere. Indeed, notes anthropologist Philippe Bour 
gois, "the Atlantic Zone [of Costa Rica and Panama] is one of the few 
places in the world where bourgeois Blacks exploit an underprivileged 
white minority."44 
The West Indian experience in the banana zones diverges sharply from 
that of black workers elsewhere in Latin America. If anything it is most 
similar to that of European immigrants in the coffee zones of S?o Paulo. In 
both cases, immigrants were imported to work as plantation laborers, and 
as the export boom receded in the 1920s and 1930s those workers cap 
italized on their position to acquire small- and medium-sized holdings on 
former plantation land and upward mobility into a rural middle class. 
Clearly, these successes of black workers in one setting and white workers 
in another cannot be explained by "race" in any biological or cultural 
sense. But employers' visions of race, and their decisions concerning race, 
are certainly relevant to the story. 
In Brazil, Cuba, and southern South America, native-born employers 
gave open preference to European workers over blacks, granting the for 
mer much greater opportunities for employment and upward mobility. US 
based employers in Central America and the Caribbean shared many of 
their Latin American counterparts' racial assumptions, and imposed rigid 
forms of racial organization and segregation on their Latin American work 
forces. But they also lobbied for the entry of the West Indian immigrants 
into Central America, Cuba, and Venezuela, and hired hundreds of thou 
sands of them. West Indian advancement and upward mobility in those 
countries demonstrated that black immigrants had as high a potential for 
risk-taking, hard work and achievement as white immigrants, directly con 
tradicting the racial images of the age.45 The very success of both immi 
grant groups, however, and their close, if conflictual, relation with the firms 
and employers who hired them, posed difficult challenges for labor move 
ments struggling to organize workers in the cities, plantations, and mining 
zones of Latin America. As in the United States at the same time, how did 
those movements confront the task of mobilizing labor forces riven by 
enormous ethnic, national, and racial diversity? 
Unionization 
The export years marked the beginnings of unionization in Latin America. 
Such mobilization was concentrated in centers of export production, which 
earlier historians tended to attribute to the presence of immigrants imbued 
with European doctrines of anarchism and socialism. More recent work has 
made clear the equal and often greater participation of native-born work 
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ers and activists. This suggests that unionization was most advanced in 
export centers, not because of the presence of immigrants, but because of 
the ways in which export production fostered the creation of large, 
industrial-style labor forces and accompanying forms of organization.46 
Because of immigration, these labor forces were often multiracial and 
multinational in character, a factor which historians of the period see as 
one of the primary obstacles to unionization.47 Racialized immigration 
programs and informal employer preferences for some racial or ethnic 
groups over others badly aggravated such divisions, which employers did 
not hesitate to use as a weapon against worker mobilization. In the Bra 
zilian port of Santos, the city's dock and warehouse monopoly resorted to 
black strikebreakers, many of them former slaves freed in the emancipa 
tion of 1888, to break immigrant-led strikes during the 1890s and early 
1900s; textile firms in Rio de Janeiro threatened to replace restive Italian 
and Spanish workers with unemployed Portuguese and Afro-Brazilians; 
and in 1919 the S?o Paulo Tramway Company broke a strike of white 
conductors and drivers by promoting black workers whom it had previ 
ously confined to laying track.48 
In each of those cases, black strikebreakers were used against white 
strikers; but racial divisions could just as easily be used against black 
strikers. For example, during the first decades of the 1900s most port work 
ers in Havana were Afro-Cubans organized into semi-religious fraternal 
organizations, the Abaku? lodges, that negotiated contracts with dock and 
warehouse companies. When these workers joined the general strike of 
1935, the companies brought in 900 strikebreakers, most of them native 
born white peasants from southern Havana province. Following the defeat 
of the strike, these replacement workers were retained in their positions, 
with the result that by 1940 the work force in the port was majority white 
and the Abaku? lodges were no longer a power on the docks.49 
Probably the most effective cultivator and exploiter of ethnic and 
racial divisions among its workers was the United Fruit Company. Early 
strikes by West Indians in Costa Rica were defeated in part by exploiting 
conflicts among groups of workers from different islands; and following a 
particularly hard-fought wave of strikes in 1918 and 1919 the Company 
began to diversify the labor force further by hiring Hispanic Costa Ricans 
and Nicaraguans. This led to the entry into the banana zones of communist 
organizers from the central highlands who actively sought to promote 
cross-racial unity against the company but proved unable to overcome 
antipathies between Hispanic and West Indian workers. And as West Indi 
ans left plantation labor and became clerks, supervisors, or independent 
smallholders, they became correspondingly less inclined to strike. As a 
result, the general strike of 1934 was carried out primarily by Hispanic 
organizers and workers, and foundered in large part because of West Indi 
an abstention.50 
Employers' tactics to divide and conquer proved so effective because 
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they exploited very real ethnic and racial divisions among workers. How 
ever, those divisions should not be seen as automatic and inevitable out 
comes of cross-racial contact; rather, they were intensified and aggravated 
by labor-market conditions that had been made highly competitive through 
state- and employer-promoted immigration programs, and in which that 
competition had been structured, again through state policies and employ 
er preferences, along racial and ethnic lines. The result was frequent ani 
mosity and antagonism among members of competing groups. 
Recent studies of working-class life in Rio de Janeiro and S?o Paulo 
during the export years argue the "fundamental role played by national 
and racial rivalries in workplace conflicts" as well as in life outside the 
workplace. Ethnic and racial tensions spilled over in fights and confronta 
tions in bars and on street corners, and occasionally in full-fledged riots.51 
Italy's invasions of Abyssinia, first in 1895 and again in 1936, provoked 
fighting in S?o Paulo between blacks and Italians; competition between 
black and Italian Carnival clubs in working-class neighborhoods of Rio de 
Janeiro erupted in "considerable violence" and the Italians appealing to 
their consul for protection; and on May 13,1908, the twentieth anniversay 
of emancipation, fighting broke out between black and Portuguese mem 
bers of the Rio stevedores' union after two Portuguese candidates were 
elected president and treasurer of the historically black union. In the weeks 
following the altercation, the organization collapsed, losing almost all of its 
4,000 members.52 
Ethnic divisions were equally problematic in Cuba, where the League 
of Cuban Workers was founded in 1899 specifically to defend Cuban work 
ers from Spanish competition. Calling for national legislation that would 
mandate a minimum requirement of seventy-five percent native-born 
workers in every enterprise, the League centered its efforts on the tobacco 
industry, where in 1902 Cuban workers struck to demand equal access to 
apprenticeships "without distinctions of race." Despite (or perhaps because 
of) mediation by a blue-ribbon committee of black and white indepen 
dence war commanders, the strike failed and the League collapsed shortly 
thereafter. It left in its wake, however, a counterorganization of Spanish 
anarchists, the Workers Alliance, who criticized the League for aggravating 
ethnic and racial tensions in the labor movement.53 Cuban activist Carlos 
Bali?o struck back in 1909, denouncing the anarchists' complicity with 
employers' racial preferences. "There are guilds where work is so monopo 
lized by Spanish workers that few Cubans work in the trade," he bitterly 
observed, "and not one black."54 
Racial tensions were even greater in countries receiving West Indian 
immigration. European immigration badly undercut the position of locally 
born "national" workers, both black and white; but those workers, appar 
ently accepting the whitening ideologies hegemonic at the time, never pro 
tested such immigration in racial terms. West Indians, by contrast, repre 
sented the complete negation of whitening, and were further tainted by 
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their association in the public mind with foreign capital. In their struggles 
with the immigrants, Hispanic workers were not above invoking racist 
stereotypes and language in an effort to construct cross-class nationalist 
alliances with local elites and the middle class. In appeals to the national 
Congress in the 1920s and 1930s, Costa Rican workers in the banana zones 
raised 
the black problem, which is of transcendental importance, because in the prov 
ince of Lim?n it constitutes a situation of privilege for this race and of manifest 
inferiority for the white race to which we belong. It is not possible to get along 
with them, because their evil ways do not permit it; for them the family does not 
exist, nor does the honor of the woman, and thus they live in an overcrowding 
and a promiscuity which is dangerous for our homes.55 
Honduran banana workers used similar language in their calls to expel 
West Indians from the country, threatening with death those who failed to 
leave.56 The nationalist Panama for Panamanians movement cited Nazi 
anti-Semitic laws as a model for how to treat the immigrants.57 The worst 
case by far was the Dominican Republic, where in 1937 the Trujillo regime 
ordered the massacre of 10,000-20,000 Haitians and native-born Domini 
cans of Haitian ancestry.58 
Racial and ethnic differences clearly formed a significant source of 
division and discord among Latin American labor forces during the export 
years. But while acknowledging such divisions, we should also note a strong 
countervailing tendency in regional labor movements, one that was very 
much at odds with the racism hegemonic in the Atlantic world at that time 
and with dominant trends in labor mobilization in the United States and 
South Africa. This tendency was a purposeful effort by workers and orga 
nizers to reach across ethnic and racial divides to construct a unified, pan 
racial labor movement. Such efforts faced enormous and sometimes over 
powering obstacles, as evidenced by the instances of labor conflict just 
cited. But the very fact that, for example, Afro-Brazilian and Portuguese 
workers came to blows in the Rio dockworkers' union in 1908 reflects their 
attempt to join forces in a single, cross-racial organization. And while that 
effort foundered, others were more successful. The particular brand of 
reformist, "laborist" (trabalhista) unionism that became dominant in Rio 
de Janeiro was the product of substantial participation by Brazilian work 
ers and activists, both white and black, in the city's labor movement. The 
S?o Paulo unions, heavily dominated both in their membership and their 
leadership by Europeans, were far more radical in their orientation; but 
even this immigrant-dominated movement came out forcefully against ra 
cial and ethnic preferences in the workplace and made active efforts to 
recruit an Afro-Brazilian constituency.59 
Efforts toward cross-racial mobilization were equally visible in Cuba, 
and in some ways more remarkable. Cuba represented potentially the most 
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conflictual locus of cross-racial contact in the entire hemisphere: a planta 
tion society already riven by racial divisions, badly devastated during the 
independence war of 1895-1898, and then inundated first by European and 
then by West Indian immigration. The likelihood of interracial conflict was 
very great, and in fact such conflict did briefly explode in the previously 
mentioned Race War of 1912. 
"Nothing is as complicated, nor does any 
thing have a more alarming character," observed the Afro-Cuban news 
paper Labor Nueva in 1916, "than the current problem of races. The issue 
is so delicate that . . . nobody dares confront it."60 
Despite the pressure-cooker quality of Cuban racial interactions, 
workers in the island succeeded in constructing perhaps the most genuinely 
pan-racial labor movement to be found anywhere in the Americas. As early 
as the first decade of the 1900s, Spanish anarchists and Afro-Cuban veter 
ans of the independence wars were collaborating in efforts to organize 
black and white workers in the island's sugar industry.61 The sugar compa 
nies began importing West Indians in the 1910s in part as a means of 
defeating those efforts, but Cuban activists responded by including West 
Indians in their organizing campaigns. The result was the creation in 1932 
of a thoroughly integrated national sugar workers' union that explicitly 
called for racial equality in hiring. The sugar workers in turn formed part of 
a larger National Confederation of Labor, closely tied to the Communist 
party, in both of which organizations Afro-Cuban members and activists 
like Jes?s Men?ndez, L?zaro Pe?a, and Blas Roca played prominent roles. 
The Confederation seconded the sugar workers' call for racial equality in 
hiring and, in a particularly courageous and controversial move, opposed 
the government's forcible repatriation of West Indian and Spanish immi 
grants during the Depression.62 
In searching for explanations for this tendency toward cross-racial 
organization, it is tempting to argue that it was not Latin American work 
ers who were unusual, but rather workers in the United States and South 
Africa. The Latin American experience seems to bear out Marxist (and, for 
that matter, liberal developmentalist) predictions that industrialization and 
proletarianization will tend to break down racial and ethnic identities and 
replace them with class-based identities and solidarities. Yet we know that 
this did not happen in multiracial societies where industrialization and 
economic development were comparable to, or more advanced than, Latin 
America; nor, as we have just seen, did economic growth tend to reduce 
racial divisions and conflicts among Latin American workers.63 Race re 
mained absolutely central to public thought and discourse during the ex 
port years, and the intense competition among workers for jobs and liveli 
hood continued to be defined in racial and ethnic terms. Far from dissolving 
racial divisions and conflicts, the experiences of the export years probably 
worked to aggravate them. 
This makes all the more striking the record of Latin American labor 
movements in working to oppose and overcome those divisions. Doubtless 
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part of the explanation for that tendency can be found in the political 
ideologies dominant among the region's activists. Anarchist, socialist, and 
communist organizers consistently called for cross-racial solidarity in con 
fronting employers and the state; communist organizers were especially 
persistent in pursuing that goal.64 But again, we may note that similar 
ideologies were invoked in the United States and South Africa, without 
producing the same effect; and while Latin American organizers called for 
pan-racialism, their rhetoric and practices were not always free of the rac 
ist stereotypes and assumptions that circulated throughout the Atlantic 
world.65 
In the end, the most likely explanation for the multiracial character of 
the region's labor movements is, I believe, the multiracial character of its 
labor history. Throughout the colonial period and into the nineteenth 
century?indeed, in most of the region, into the twentieth century and 
down to the present?Latin American labor forces were racially mixed and 
majority nonwhite. Slavery, forced Indian labor, and the racial laws of the 
"caste regime" imposed a structure of racial hierarchy on the region's 
workforces during the colonial period and left a strong legacy of white 
racial superiority.66 But particularly in Spanish America, the process of 
independence in the early 1800s broke the legal structure of white suprem 
acy and challenged its ideological structure. Independence could not have 
been won without support from black soldiers and officers; the price of that 
support was the overturning of colonial racial legislation and its replace 
ment with republican laws and ideologies that explicitly rejected racial 
inequality. As a result, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Latin 
America never experienced the herrenvolk, whites-only democracies of the 
United States and South Africa. When elites sought to limit popular politi 
cal participation, as they did throughout the export period, they did so 
using class-based criteria?for example, restricting suffrage to those who 
met income or literacy requirements?or through generalized fraud, rather 
than through racial exclusion. 
In such a setting in which nonwhites represented the majority of na 
tional labor forces (and even oligarchical elites were forced to accept the 
principle of juridical racial equality), it is difficult to imagine the conditions 
under which labor movements could have adopted approaches based on 
racial exclusion or white supremacy. And in fact, with the exception of 
Central America, there is no evidence that white workers in the region, 
either immigrant or native-born, ever considered pushing for racial prefer 
ences. Rather, the tendency in labor congresses, the labor press, and orga 
nizing practices was exactly the contrary: a consistent effort to promote 
working-class unity across racial and ethnic lines. 
Thus, when Colombian elites attempted to use racial stereotyping and 
divisions against labor movements in that country, workers responded by 
embracing those stereotypes and turning them to their own advantage. In 
1933, at the height of the Depression, a slate of union members was elected 
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to the town council of Manizales. The newspapers made no mention of 
their having been Afro-Colombian; given the racial composition of the 
region, they were most likely a racially mixed group of mestizos, whites, 
and blacks. Nevertheless, local elites responded to their election by ridicul 
ing them as "the Council of Blacks," a racialized reference to their lower 
class origins. Rather than rejecting the label, the councilmen promptly 
adopted it as their collective motto, using it in alternation with the class 
based "Sons of the Workshops and the Fields." This incident then repeated 
itself at the national level in the 1940s, when populist presidential candidate 
Jorge Gait?n was scornfully dismissed by his opponents as "el negro 
Gait?n"?a label that, like the councilmen of Manizales, he embraced in 
his speeches and posters as a sign of his working-class origins.67 
The cross-racial mobilization of the export years became a hallmark of 
the labor-based populist movements that took power in much of the region 
in the 1940s and 1950s, and the blackness that had long been synonymous 
with lower- and working-class status in Latin America remained so. In one 
sense this reflected a positive achievement?the rejection by the region's 
workers of formal segregation or institutionalized racial preferences in 
employment. But while workers rejected white supremacy in theory, many 
of them lived a modified form of it in practice. Neither the mobilizations of 
the export years nor postwar populism proved able to overturn prevailing 
structures of class and racial privilege in the region. During the postwar 
years, the children and grandchildren of white workers favored in employ 
ment during the first half of the century made their way upward into the 
expanding middle class, while their black counterparts remained over 
whelmingly proletarian and overwhelmingly poor, further strengthening 
the association between nonwhite racial status and working-class social 
status.68 Far from undoing this legacy of the colonial period, the export 
years reaffirmed it. 
Conclusion 
Black peasants' and workers' hard bargaining with employers in the years 
following emancipation, and their determination not to submit to forms of 
labor discipline reminiscent in any way of slavery, drove employers to 
strike back in two ways that profoundly shaped the history of the export 
years. The first was the dispossession of black and other peasants from the 
land; the second was state-sponsored racialized migration programs. Both 
responses undercut the bargaining position of Afro-Latin-American work 
ers, and both varied in intensity in relation to local economies' level of 
participation in the export boom. 
In the primary centers of export production, black dispossession from 
the land proceeded rapidly and was virtually complete by the end of the 
export period. In secondary areas, it proceeded more gradually, extending 
well into the second half of the 1900s. Whatever the pace, it had the effect 
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of driving former peasants into the wage-labor force, at first in the country 
side and increasingly, as the century wore on, in the cities. 
Like rates of land dispossession, levels of immigration also corre 
sponded to local economies' participation in world markets. Scientific rac 
ism posited that white workers produced high rates of growth and output. 
But in Latin America, the causal relationship was more nearly the oppo 
site: Regions with resource and capital endowments capable of generating 
high levels of productivity were those most likely to attract white migra 
tion. White immigrants did not bring growth. Rather, export-based growth 
brought white immigrants, who then enjoyed privileged access to the jobs 
and opportunities produced by the boom. 
Growth brought black immigrants as well, but only to those countries 
where they were allowed to enter. Restrictions on black immigration were 
relaxed only in countries in which demand for labor badly exceeded local 
supply. Even in the face of such demand, local elites never fully accepted 
black immigrants, who were most actively pursued not by native employers 
but by US-owned firms concerned primarily with productivity and indif 
ferent to the goal of "improving" the racial composition of the region. 
Racialized migration heightened tensions among work forces in the 
export centers. This posed a formidable obstacle to labor mobilization, but 
an obstacle to which local workers and activists responded with a 
surprising?given the racial doctrines and tensions of the day?spirit of 
racial inclusion and egalitarianism. While cross-racial mobilization was the 
exception rather than the rule in the United States during this period, the 
reverse was true in Latin America, and to this day levels of racial coexis 
tence and equality are far higher in the region's poor and working classes 
than among middle classes and the elites.69 
Still, the damage had been done. Differential patterns of export-based 
growth, combined with the racial doctrines of the export years, led to 
radically different levels of opportunity for white and nonwhite upward 
mobility in the region. With few exceptions, black workers were diverted 
from the most desirable lands, jobs, and opportunities of the export zones. 
Where they retained access to land and work, it was in less dynamic and 
productive regions or occupations. The result may be seen in higher rates of 
black impoverishment during the export years and into the second half of 
the 1900s, and in notable underrepresentation of Afro-Latin-Americans in 
the middle class. 
This lack of black upward mobility was in part the result of black 
struggles to avoid proletarianization, which made many employers view 
Afro-Latin-Americans as problematic and unattractive workers. In foster 
ing such negative images of black workers, those struggles may have had 
the unintended consequence of consigning future generations of Afro 
Latin-Americans to permanent proletarian status. But one cannot assign 
blame for black workers' impoverishment without taking into account the 
experience of slavery, which hardened their bargaining demands, and the 
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doctrines and ideologies which led employers to view those demands not 
through the lens of class but rather through the lens of race. Black workers 
during the export years struggled, not just against economic and political 
forces beyond their control, but against ideological forces?and the histori 
cal experience of the slave past. It was hardly surprising that the struggle 
proved unequal, both during the export years and after. 
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